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Erroneous gambling-related beliefs as illusions of 
primary and secondary control: a confirmatory factor 
analysis 
Abstract: Different classification systems for erroneous beliefs about gambling have 
been proposed, consistently alluding to ‘illusion of control’ and ‘gambler’s fallacy’ 
categories. None of these classification systems have, however, considered the how 
the illusion of control and the gambler’s fallacy might be interrelated. In this paper, we 
report the findings of a confirmatory factor analysis that examines the proposal that 
most erroneous gambling-related beliefs can be defined in terms of Rothbaum et al.’s 
(1982) distinction between ‘primary’ and ‘secondary’ illusory control, with the former 
being driven to a large extent by the well-known gambler’s fallacy and the latter being 
driven by a complex of beliefs about supernatural forces such as God and luck. A 
survey consisting of 100 items derived from existing instruments was administered to 
329 participants. The analysis confirmed the existence of two latent structures (beliefs 
in primary and secondary control), while also offering support to the idea that 
gambler’s fallacy-style reasoning may underlie both perceived primary control and 
beliefs about the cyclical nature of luck, a form of perceived secondary control. The 
results suggest the need for a greater focus on the role of underlying processes or 
belief structures as factors that foster susceptibility to specific beliefs in gambling 
situations. Addressing and recognising the importance of these underlying factors may 
also have implications for cognitive therapy treatments for problem gambling. 
Keywords: gambling-related beliefs; illusion of control; gambler’s fallacy; luck; 
factor analysis 
Introduction 
Erroneous beliefs about gambling have long been thought to play a role in the 
development and maintenance of problem gambling (e.g., Ladouceur et al., 2001; 
Walker, 1992b). The beliefs have been documented in therapy case studies, 
interviews, and transcripts of gambling sessions in which players verbalise their 
thoughts (Griffiths, 1994; Keren & Wagenaar, 1985; Ladouceur, Sylvain, Boutin & 
*BLIND Manuscript without contact information




































































Doucet, 2002; Livingstone, Wooley & Borrell, 2006; Toneatto et al., 1997; Walker, 
1992a). Surveys of these beliefs have also been developed, typically requiring the 
respondent to express his or her degree of agreement with a number of erroneous 
statements about gambling (e.g., “My choices or actions affect the game on which I’m 
betting”’; for a review, see Goodie & Fortune, 2013).  
Suggestions about categories of erroneous gambling-related beliefs have come 
in the form of survey factor analyses and theoretical reviews of the original interviews 
and session transcripts. Both types of suggestions (interpretations of factor analysis 
results and qualitative reviews) often make reference to the ‘illusion of control’, the 
‘gambler’s fallacy’, and the more general heuristics and biases literature of which the 
gambler’s fallacy literature is a part (e.g., Fortune & Goodie, 2012; Griffiths, 1994; 
Raylu & Oei, 2004; Toneatto, 1999; Wagenaar 1988; Wood & Clapham, 2005). This 
paper proposes and tests a conceptual framework according to which most erroneous 
gambling-related beliefs can be categorised with reference to two variants of the 
illusion of control, both of which reflect the gambler’s fallacy. 
Conceptual issues surrounding existing belief typologies 
Factor-analytic investigations of belief-survey data and other typologies of erroneous 
gambling-related beliefs have consistently made reference to the illusion of control, 
the gambler’s fallacy or ‘representativeness bias’, and biases other than 
representativeness. The illusion of control refers to the tendency for people to 
overestimate the extent to which their actions (e.g., choices) influence outcomes in 
games of chance. In a seminal study, Langer (1975) observed that people placed 
greater value on lottery tickets they had chosen than on ones they had been randomly 
allocated. Langer concluded that the illusion of control occurs as a result of the 
confusion of games of chance with skilled activities, since games of chance almost 
invariably possess features of skilled tasks. These features include opportunity for 
choice and physical involvement (e.g., as when a lottery allows for ticket choice). In a 
later literature review, Rothbaum, Weisz and Snyder (1982) suggested that there are 
two types of the illusion of control: ‘primary’ and ‘secondary’. Illusory primary 
control relates to strategies aimed at physically changing the game environment, 
whereas illusory secondary control involves attempts to influence outcomes through 




































































The gambler’s fallacy is a well-documented belief about the sequencing of 
chance-based outcomes. Specifically, it is the belief that random sequences tend to 
self-correct even in the short-term, producing a ‘head’ after a series of ‘tails’ in a coin 
toss game, a ‘red’ after a series of ‘blacks’ in roulette, and a win after a series of losses 
on slot machines (Nickerson, 2002; Oskarsson, Van Boven, McClelland & Hastie, 
2009). The fallacy is commonly expressed in behaviours such as the seeking out of 
slot machines that are ‘due’ for a win (e.g., Jefferson & Nicki, 2003). The most widely 
cited explanation for the fallacy is Kahneman and Tversky’s (1972) proposal that, 
when making judgements about whether a stimulus (e.g., a sequence) is a member of 
some stimulus category (e.g., random sequences), people consistently apply the 
‘heuristic’, or short-cut, of making the decision based on the extent to which the 
stimulus possesses the category’s defining features (e.g., equiprobability of possible 
outcomes). Decision-making based on heuristics such as this ‘representativeness 
heuristic’ is usually efficient but can lead to systematic errors, known as ‘biases’. 
Under this account, the gambler’s fallacy, the erroneous belief that short random 
sequences must possess the essential characteristics of long random sequences, is one 
example of the bias resulting from the application of the representativeness heuristic. 
Typologies of erroneous gambling-related beliefs have also identified belief 
categories stemming from the misapplication of other identified heuristics, including, 
most notably, the ‘availability heuristic’ (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973, 1974). 
Essentially, existing typologies classify erroneous gambling-related beliefs as 
instances of ‘representativeness, availability or other (including the illusion of 
control)’ (Fortune & Goodie, 2012; Griffiths, 1994; Toneatto, 1999; Toneatto et al., 
1997).  
A problem with this classification system is that it defines the illusion of 
control and the gambler’s fallacy as separate belief categories even though many of 
the beliefs relating to systems and strategies in gambling (often considered instances 
of the illusion of control) are likely to be related to the gambler’s fallacy. For example, 
people who have a strategy for picking slot machines, knowing when to stop playing, 
or knowing which numbers to pick in roulette or lotteries will often refer to outcomes 
being more (or less) likely because of the preceding event sequence (e.g., Livingstone, 




































































A related problem is that, given the number of ‘gambler’s fallacy’ beliefs that 
can be labelled instances of the illusion of control, it might be the case that many 
‘gamblers fallacy’ beliefs can be accounted for without reference to heuristics and 
biases. Instead, accounts and typologies could be based on existing explanations of the 
illusion of control, of which Langer’s (1975) original explanation is but one (for 
alternative explanations, see Bar-Hillel & Neter, 1996; Cummins & Nistico, 2002; 
Leotti, Iyengar & Ochsner, 2010; Rothbaum, Weisz & Snyder, 1982; Thompson, 
Armstrong & Thomas, 1998). 
Another potential difficulty with gambling-beliefs typologies is that they do 
not recognise potential interrelationships between ‘beliefs about luck’ and the illusion 
of control and gambler’s fallacy. Typologies and surveys of gambling-related beliefs 
most frequently define luck as a supernatural force with which players attempt to 
engage through rituals and objects (e.g., lucky charms; Henslin, 1967; Joukhador, 
Blaszczynski & Macallum, 2004; Toneatto, 1999). Appealing to luck in this way is a 
form of illusory secondary control under Rothbaum et al.’s (1982) definition. Luck 
may also be linked to the gambler’s fallacy in that those who subscribe to the fallacy 
may reason that luck comes in cycles. Indeed, people have reported believing that a 
skilled player is one who is able to know when their luck is ‘in season’ and who can 
anticipate when luck is no longer available (Keren & Wagenaar, 1985). People have 
also been found to conceive of luck as a stable personal quality, possessed by 
individuals to various degrees (Wohl & Enzle, 2009). 
Given the unresolved conceptual issues surrounding typologies of erroneous 
gambling-related beliefs, it is necessary to suggest a typology that accounts for 
possible interrelationships between the gambler’s fallacy, the illusion of control and 
beliefs about luck. To achieve this, it is also necessary to better define the illusion of 
control, considering competing explanations for it and, in light of these considerations, 
determining whether there is merit to defining the illusion in terms of ‘primary’ and 
‘secondary’ variants. Below, we outline one possible explanation for the illusion of 
control – an explanation that recognises the illusion’s relationship to the gambler’s 
fallacy and beliefs about luck, and that distinguishes between the illusion’s primary 




































































from this explanation is then outlined, along with an approach to testing whether the 
conceptual framework underlying the typology is sound. 
An alternative typology 
Our conceptual framework for classifying erroneous gambling-related beliefs proceeds 
from the assumption that the vast majority of documented erroneous gambling-related 
beliefs are instances of the illusion of control, in that they are beliefs about effective 
actions to take while gambling. The conceptual framework is further informed by an 
emerging literature in cognitive science that has drawn attention to the role played by 
existing general belief structures in influencing how people might respond to 
situations, including gambling situations (Murphy & Medin, 1985; Wellman & 
Gelman, 1992).  
Instances of the illusion of control are defined not merely as the result of 
situational factors (choice, physical involvement, etc.) as Langer suggested, but as the 
result of an interaction between situational factors and existing belief structures. Not 
only can existing belief structures cause particular situational factors to be noticed, but 
apparent situational factors can be interpreted in light of belief structures (Murphy & 
Medin, 1985) while players in games of chance look for ways of obtaining a sizeable 
win. For example, in relation to the illusion of secondary control, it is likely that there 
are broader belief structures that make people susceptible to beliefs of this nature. As 
Atran and Norenzayan (2004) point out, three broad interconnected belief structures 
about supernatural beings are observed across cultures and mostly likely to be by-
products of the evolution of adaptive cognitive faculties. These are beliefs in 
supernatural agents (e.g., gods, ghosts, luck), beliefs in the power and omniscience of 
these agents with regard to important events (e.g., death and calamity), and beliefs 
about rituals directed at the agents (e.g., wearing lucky socks).  
Other general belief structures (again, very likely evolved) are likely to 
underlie people’s susceptibility to illusions of primary control. However, whereas the 
illusion of secondary control may be influenced by a structure of beliefs about 
supernatural entities, the illusion of primary control must be the product of belief 
structures relating to non-supernatural (i.e., natural/physical) phenomena. We propose 




































































structure. It is general in that it has been argued to be unavoidable in games of chance, 
due to the operation of the representativeness heuristic (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974), 
or because people only ever encounter short random outcomes, which, it turns out, 
have particular features, such as a lower probability of strings of three identical 
outcomes (Hahn & Warren, 2009). 
A summary of how items in gambling-beliefs surveys could be classified in 
light of this conceptual framework is presented in Figure 1 and Table 1. The illusions 
of primary and secondary control are presented as belief categories expressed through 
agreement with the survey statements. Sub-categories of survey statements are shown 
as arising, at least in part, from the gambler’s fallacy and/or supernatural beliefs as 
defined by Atran and Norenzayan (2004). The joint influence of these broader belief 
structures results in the belief that luck appears and disappears in cycles. Otherwise, 
the gambler’s fallacy gives rise to sub-categories of the illusion of primary control 
while general supernatural beliefs give rise to sub-categories of the illusion of 
secondary control. We elaborate on the sub-categories below, with example survey 
statements being presented in Table 1. 
Figure 1 about here 
Table 1 about here 
Beliefs reflecting the illusion of primary control 
With respect to perceived primary control, an inspection of interview data and 
gambling-beliefs survey items points to three principal sub-categories, all potentially 
reflecting the gambler’s fallacy in some way. The first consists of strategies arising 
directly from the fallacy; that is, directly from the ‘negative recency’ expectation that, 
in games of chance, the most recent outcome types will fail to repeat (Oskarsson et al., 
2009). Strategies in this category include waiting for a win that is due, betting 
progressively higher amounts on one colour in roulette in expectation that the colour 
will be the winning one eventually, and alternating between colours in line with 
expectations of what outcome the random roulette wheel will produce next. Use of the 
two latter strategies has been observed in field settings (Walker, 1992b) and 




































































A second set of statements in gambling-beliefs surveys contain references to 
systems of play (i.e., strategies) more generally. Since the gambler’s fallacy is central 
to human (or, at least, Western) concepts of chance, it is possible that many strategies 
in gambling are informed by the fallacy. However, it is possible that playing systems 
are additionally informed by beliefs less general than the gambler’s fallacy – beliefs 
about specific situational aspects of the task. Some of these situational factors were 
identified by Langer. For example, the free spin feature on slot machines, a choice and 
physical-involvement factor in Langer’s terms, gives rise to numerous strategic beliefs 
(Livingstone, Wooley & Borrell, 2006). Another way of defining these more-
situation-specific beliefs is as rules for playing acquired through learning, problem-
solving, or conditioning (e.g., Anderson, 1990; Skinner, 1948). 
The third natural sub-category is a set of beliefs about the effectiveness of a 
persistence strategy in gambling. It follows from the gambler’s fallacy that, after a 
series of losses, persistence in playing on a particular chosen option or slot machine 
makes a win imminent in the short-term. However, the belief in an imminent win can 
also proceed from a general adaptive sense of optimism (Cummins & Nistico, 2002), 
and from a feeling of entrapment in a losing investment (Walker, 1992b). Overall, 
then, the illusion of primary control expresses itself in three belief categories, shaped 
by the gambler’s fallacy, learning and motivational factors. 
Beliefs reflecting the illusion of secondary control 
Beliefs constituting the illusion of secondary control in a gambling context appear to 
fall into the sub-categories prescribed by the existing characterisation of supernatural 
beliefs (Atran & Norenzayan, 2004). Table 1, once again, provides examples of 
representative survey statements. The first sub-category of supernatural control beliefs 
pertains to the omniscience and power of supernatural agents. With regard to one 
supernatural agent, luck, the fact that people believe it to be influential in important 
life events (e.g., escape from negative consequences) has even been demonstrated 
empirically (Wagenaar & Keren, 1988). Also indicative of belief in the omniscience 
and power of luck is the belief that luck is a personal quality (e.g., Wohl & Enzle, 
2009). This belief is consistent with the general belief that omniscient divine agents 




































































The second sub-category refers to ritual appeals to supernatural agents. 
Sociologists Henslin (1967) and King (1990) made note of the abundance of rituals 
and lucky charms in craps and bingo. For example, Henslin observed that, since 
dropping the dice in craps is considered a bad omen, “without exception, each shooter, 
after dropping the dice, rubs both dice on the ground or playing surface” (p. 323)1. 
The third sub-category of illusory secondary control consists of variations on 
the belief that the supernatural agent luck is cyclical. As Keren and Wagenaar (1985) 
reported in summarizing interviews with 150 blackjack players: 
Most of our subjects (some of them explicitly) perceived luck as having a wave form. 
The art of the game is to catch the crest of the wave, that is, the lucky periods. (p. 152; 
see also Duong and Ohtsuka (2000) and King (1990)) 
On the one hand, believing in a cyclical luck implies believing that luck is an agent – 
an entity capable of varying its intentions, or ‘moods’. In this sense, the belief 
proceeds from the general supernatural beliefs structure. At the same time, the belief 
proceeds from the gambler’s fallacy in implying that runs of positive (and negative) 
outcomes are bound to end in the short-term. Notably, cyclical properties tend to be 
attributed to luck and not other supernatural agents (e.g., God, Fate). This could be 
due to the fact that beliefs about luck are particularly relevant to gambling and 
therefore more likely to be influenced by a gambling-related belief structure – the 
gambler’s fallacy. Beliefs in the cyclical nature of luck, thus, appear to be shaped by 
supernatural beliefs and the gambler’s fallacy simultaneously. 
The present study 
This study aimed to determine whether psychometric analyses of a comprehensive 
gambling-beliefs survey could reveal primary and secondary illusory control 
constructs with their respective sub-categories. The survey consisted of 100 
statements, largely from existing surveys. Statements were adapted to refer 
specifically to a purely chance-based form of gambling – slot-machine play. In light of 
a well-documented trend for participants to disagree with most erroneous survey 
statements about gambling, participants were selected in such a way various levels of 
                                                 
1
 While many rituals in gambling contexts may result from broader supernatural beliefs, rituals can also 
emerge from simple conditioning processes (Jahoda 1969; Skinner 1948). The advocated conceptual 




































































slot machine gambling experience were represented.  People who gamble regularly 
were expected to be more likely to agree with statements, thereby providing variability 
in responses. Each of the belief sub-categories described above was expressed in terms 
of a unique set of statements. For example, degree of belief in the ‘omniscience and 
power’ of supernatural agents was calculated by averaging agreement ratings for the 
sample statements in Table 1 and the statements: “Following lucky signs can help me 
win”, “Bad vibes from people around me cause me to lose”, “I make the right choice 
because I’m generally lucky”, “It’s possible for the good or bad luck of other players 
to rub off on me”, “I have the psychic ability to predict a winner”, and “There is useful 
information in my daily horoscope”.  
Confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) was used to determine whether 
relationships between the belief sub-categories could be accounted for by higher-order 
primary and secondary illusory control constructs. In CFA, models are fitted to a 
matrix of covariances between observed (i.e., measured) variables, termed 
‘indicators’. Higher-order ‘latent’, or unobserved, factors predicted by the model can 
then be derived through multiple regression (see, for example, Kline, 2010). In our 
model, the belief sub-categories served as the indicators, and Figure 2 outlines model 
predictions regarding latent constructs. Beliefs in ‘negative recency’, ‘systems of 
play’, and ‘persistence’ were predicted to be indicators of the illusion of primary 
control. Meanwhile, the illusion of supernatural control was predicted to express itself 
in beliefs in the ‘omniscience and power’ of supernatural agents, as well as in beliefs 
about ‘rituals’. Beliefs about ‘the cyclical nature of luck’ were predicted to be a 
further expression of the illusion of secondary control, but also an expression of the 
illusion of primary control.  
To complement the CFA, where results were dependent on the manner in 
which items were arbitrarily parcelled into sub-categories, an exploratory factor 
analysis (EFA) was performed. EFA does not require item-parcelling, since it involves 
analysing item correlations to determine how many latent groupings best describe the 
item set (e.g., Costello & Osborne, 2005; Floyd & Widaman, 1995). The expectation 
was that the items would be described by two latent groupings, reflecting the illusions 




































































Overall, the study is geared at testing a conceptual framework for classifying 
erroneous gambling-related beliefs. Should supporting evidence be obtained, the 
framework can be used as the basis for further survey development and the discussion 
of erroneous beliefs during treatment for problem-gambling. 
Method 
Design 
The data were drawn from the survey component of a larger study in which a 
laboratory gambling session was attended two weeks after survey completion.  
Participants 
There were 329 participants
2
 (140 males), with a mean age of 24.8 (SD = 
11.88). Among them were first-year Psychology students at the University of Adelaide 
(N = 189), other students at the university (N = 118) and members of the general 
community (N = 22). Participation was only open to people who (1) were over the age 
of 18, (2) had gambled at a licensed venue at least once previously, and (3) were not in 
treatment for gambling-related problems. Recruitment processes were geared at 
ensuring that various levels of slot-machine gambling experience were represented. 
That is, advertisements placed outside the psychology department for other university 
students and the general community extended the invitation to participate only to 
people who gambled on slot machines relatively frequently (i.e., once a month or more 
often).. The end result was that, in the 12 months preceding participation, 13.7% of 
participants had not played on slot machines at all, 46.5% played a few times but not 
regularly, 14% played approximately once a month, 17.6% played two to three times a 
month, and 8.2% played weekly or more often. In terms of problem-gambling 
symptoms, responses to the Problem Gambling Severity Index (see Measures) 
suggested that 7% of participants had gambling-related problems, while 38% were at 
no risk of developing such problems, 29% were at low risk, and 25% were at moderate 
risk. 
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Figure 2 about here 
Measures: Slot-machine beliefs survey 
Apart from demographic questions, a question regarding degree of involvement in 
various forms of gambling in the past 12 months, and a Problem Gambling Severity 
Index (Ferris & Wynne, 2001), the survey contained 100 statements describing beliefs 
about slot-machine gambling. The statements are presented in Appendix A. For each 
statement, agreement was rated on a seven-point Likert scale, anchored at (-3) 
Strongly disagree, (0) Neither agree nor disagree, and (3) Strongly agree.  
The survey was designed to incorporate as many existing surveys as possible 
in their entirety without substantial overlap between items. To this effect, two surveys 
and a scale were included in full. These were the Drake Beliefs About Chance 
Inventory (Wood and Clapham 2005; 22 items), the Gamblers’ Beliefs Questionnaire 
(Steenbergh et al., 2002; 21 items
3
), and the Predictive Control Scale of the Gambling-
Related Cognitions survey (Raylu & Oei, 2004; 6 items).  
In the interests of including references to a wide variety of erroneous 
strategies, the complete surveys were supplemented by items selected from other 
existing surveys (17 items). Appendix A identifies the source survey for each item. 
Seventeen new items were also written and Appendix A details the experimental and 
observational findings on which each of these items was based. 
A further concern was that the collection of items would be suitable for a 
undergraduate students, who made up the majority of our sample. All existing surveys 
from which items were sourced have been validated within this population (for a 
review, see Goodie and Fortune, 2013). In addition, preliminary removal of items that 
correlated with few other items (see Results) ensured that existing and newly-written 
items expressing beliefs held only by experienced gamblers were not analysed. 
A final objective was to include a broader range of negatively-worded (i.e., 
objectively correct) statements, since there was only one such statement in the 
complete surveys. Eight negatively-worded items were sourced from existing surveys 
                                                 
3
 Two items from this survey were excluded because they did not express erroneous beliefs: “Gambling 
is the best way for me to experience excitement”, “When I lose at gambling, my losses are not as bad if 




































































and nine were newly-written. Notably, all negatively-worded items were reverse-
scored. 
Procedure 
Members of the general community who played slot machines regularly (once a month 
or more often) were recruited through an advertisement in a local newspaper. First-
year Psychology students who met the basic participation requirements (see 
‘Participants’) were recruited through a departmental research participation website. 
All other participants were students from other departments at the university who 
responded to poster advertisements around campus. Community and wider-university 
participants were reimbursed with a department store voucher, while the first-year 
Psychology students received course credit. 
All advertisements directed potential participants to a website where the larger 
study was explained and the survey could be completed online. Alternatively, 
participants could contact the researcher (first author) with questions and requests for 
a posted hardcopy of the survey. 
In the online version of the survey, the order of the 100 erroneous statements 
was randomised for each participant. Participants opting to complete hardcopies 
received one of three versions, each with a different random ordering of the items. 
De-briefing occurred by post or e-mail at the end of data collection. De-
briefings contained a copy of the survey, emphasised the erroneous nature of the 
survey’s positively-worded statements, and encouraged participants to contact the 
researcher if they were unclear about why any particular statement was erroneous. 
Results 
Fitting the described CFA model of relationships between sub-categories of the 
illusions of primary and secondary control (Figure 2) required a number of steps. After 
the removal of problematic survey statements, the model’s indicators, measures of the 
belief sub-categories, could be constructed. The model was then fitted, and models 




































































Removal of weak items 
As recommended by some authors (Hooper, Coughlan & Mullen, 2008; MacCallum, 
Widaman, Zhang & Hong, 1999), measurement error was reduced by removing items 
that did not correlate substantially with most other items. Specifically, items that 
correlated with 60 or more other items at a magnitude of less than .3 were identified 
for removal
4
. There were 27 such items. Among them were 14 of the 17 negatively-
worded items, so the remaining three negatively-worded items were also removed, 
leaving a total of 70 items for further analysis. Removed items are identified in 
Appendix A. 
Measures of belief sub-categories 
The retained statements were grouped according to which belief sub-category 
(‘negative recency’, ‘rituals’ etc.) they reflected. Table 2 lists the items selected to 
represent each sub-category. Measures of agreement with each sub-category (i.e., the 
indicators in the CFA model) were calculated by averaging the agreement ratings for 
constituent items (DiStefano, Zhu & Mindrila, 2009). For two participants who 
accidentally omitted some items when filling out hardcopies of the survey, sub-
category scores were calculated using a reduced set of items. 
For each sub-category score, Table 2 presents means, standard deviations, and 
distributional information (skew, kurtosis and range). The Cronbach’s alpha 
coefficients presented in the table imply internal consistency among the items 
comprising each measure. As Table 3 shows, however, almost all pairwise score 
correlations were greater than .80, suggesting that the measures had poor discriminant 
validity. This issue was addressed through the fitting of an alternative theoretically 
meaningless CFA model (see below). 
                                                 
4
 The value of .3 was chosen because correlations of .3 mean that less than 10% of variance is shared 
between items. The cut-off point of 60 such correlations was set based on the inspection of the items 
containing various amounts of low correlations. Items with 60 or more problematic correlations 
appeared qualitatively unrelated to most survey items. For example, the item “If a coin is tossed and 
comes up heads ten times in a row, the next toss is more likely to be tails” lowly correlated with 65 





































































Table 2 about here 
Table 3 about here 
Model fit 
The CFA model shown in Figure 2 was fitted using maximum likelihood estimation in 
the sem package (Fox, Nie & Byrnes, 2012) in R version 2.15.2. All fit indices 
indicated good fit (χ2(7) = 5.75, p = .56; RMSEA = 0, CI90 [0, .06]; SRMR = .006; 
CFI = 1; BIC = 87)
5
. Standardised and unstandardised parameter estimates are 
presented in Table 4.  
Table 4 about here 
Alternative models 
Aspects of the model were tested further by examining whether their removal or 
modification reduced model fit. Among the tested components was the prediction that 
beliefs about the cyclical nature of luck are an indicator of both types of illusory 
control. The test involved fitting a simpler model in which beliefs in the cyclical 
nature of luck were an indicator of the illusion of secondary control only. Obtained fit 
indices suggested that this model had a poor fit (χ2(8) = 39.64, p < .001; RMSEA = 
.11, CI90 [.08, .14]; SRMR = .016; CFI = .99; BIC = 115).  A model in which beliefs 
in the cyclical nature of luck were an indicator only of the illusion of primary control 
also fit slightly worse than the original model (χ2(8) = 12.86, p = .12; RMSEA = .04, 
CI90 [0, .08]; SRMR = .009; CFI = .99; BIC = 88). 
A further assumption of the model is that beliefs in systems of play pertain 
only to natural systems, and not supernatural ones (e.g., rituals). The assumption was 
tested by fitting a model with a hypothesized additional relationship between the 
illusion of secondary control and the ‘systems of play’ score. Incorporating this 
relationship did not improve model fit (χ2(6) = 4.51, p = .60; RMSEA = 0, CI90 [0, 
.06]; SRMR = .006; CFI = 1; BIC = 91), implying that ‘systems of play’ are 
commonly understood to refer to conventional strategies rather than rituals. 
                                                 
5
 Mardia’s tests of multivariate skew and kurtosis (Mardia, 1970; Ullman, 2006), conducted using the 
psych package (Revelle, 2012), indicated violation of the multivariate normality assumption (b1, p = 
2.4, skew = 131.43, p < .001; b2, p = 52.97, kurtosis = 4.6, p < .001). However, the effect of this 





































































 The observed high correlation between the model’s latent constructs, the 
illusions of primary and secondary control (βψ = .92; see Table 4), necessitated the 
testing of a model in which these constructs were amalgamated into a single latent 
construct. Again, however, the fit of this modified model was poor (χ2(10) = 63.88, p 
< .001; RMSEA = .13, CI90 [.10, .16]; SRMR = .023; CFI = .97; BIC = 128). 
Finally, in light of the poor discriminant validity of the belief sub-category 
measures (see Table 3), we tested the possibility that any equivalent model could 
capture the relationships between them. The fitted equivalent model featured two 
latent constructs, L1 and L2. ‘Negative recency’, ‘Omniscience and power’, ‘Rituals’ 
and ‘Systems of play’ served as indicators of L1, while L2 was expressed in terms of 
the other two sub-category scores and the shared indicator, ‘Systems of play’. The 
parameter-value search for the model failed to converge in 5000 iterations, providing 
evidence of non-equivalence among the sub-category measures. 
Exploratory factor analysis 
To demonstrate that the CFA model’s good fit was not due to the manner in which 
items were grouped into scales, an exploratory factor analysis (EFA) was conducted, 
with the expectation that items would form clusters expressing the illusions of primary 
and secondary control, once the ‘cyclical luck’ items were excluded. The exclusion of 
the ‘cyclical luck’ items was necessary because EFA is difficult to apply when items 
load on multiple factors, as the ‘cyclical luck’ items were found to do in the CFA 
(MacCallum et al., 1999).  
Full results of the EFA are reported in Appendix B, where it can be seen that 
the expected two-factor structure was obtained. Factor 1 appeared to reflect the 
illusion of primary control, in that it included nine of the 10 ‘negative recency’ items, 
27 of the 31 ‘systems of play’ items, and three out of five ‘persistence’ items. 
Meanwhile, Factor 2 corresponded to the illusion of secondary control in that it was 
defined by all eight items relating to the use of ‘rituals’ and four of the eight items 





































































The aim of this study was to examine the construct validity of a conceptual model that 
postulates that gambling-related beliefs converge around two broader belief structures 
relating to the illusion of control. The first of these structures, the illusion of primary 
control, is postulated to involve behaviours and beliefs based, to a large extent, on the 
gambler’s fallacy. A second construct, the illusion of secondary control, is assumed to 
involve behaviours and beliefs relating to general beliefs about supernatural agents 
and forces. In light of these assumptions, six sub-categories of beliefs were defined 
and measured, and a CFA model of latent primary and secondary illusory control 
constructs relating the sub-categories was specified. On the whole, it was found that 
model predictions about the relationships between belief sub-categories were 
supported. Latent primary and secondary illusory constructs also emerged in an EFA. 
The main implication of these results for typologies of erroneous gambling-
related beliefs is that the prominence of the illusion of control and the gambler’s 
fallacy in existing typologies is not a coincidence (cf. Fortune & Goodie, 2012 and 
Goodie & Fortune, 2013). The results, further, suggest a mechanism – decision-
making informed by higher-level belief structures – that accounts for the overlap 
between beliefs that might be defined as expressing the illusion of control, the 
gambler’s fallacy, and various beliefs about luck, a supernatural agent. 
The results also have implications for conceptualisations of the illusion of 
control. They support the earlier work of Rothbaum, Weisz and Snyder (1982), who 
argued that the illusion of control is not a one-dimensional construct. The results are 
also consistent with an earlier study by Ejova, Delfabbro and Navarro (2010), who 
provided evidence of the illusion’s bi-dimensionality using a multi-item perceived 
control question presented after experience with a laboratory gambling task. The 
question consisted of 13 statements, each rated form 0 to 10 in terms of the degree to 
which it might have accounted for experienced wins. Apart from “It was all chance”, 
the statements included, (1) “My skill in playing”, (2) “I developed a logical strategy”, 
(3) “I deserved to win”, and (4) “I took advantage of moments when my luck was 
good”. Factor analysis revealed a statement cluster consisting of statements such as 1 




































































The present findings extend this work by providing evidence for an 
explanation of why the illusion of control has two dimensions. Specifically, the CFA 
model’s good fit serves as evidence for the proposal that one dimension (secondary) is 
the result of general beliefs about supernatural agents, whereas the other (primary) is 
the result of non-supernatural beliefs, including the general gambler’s fallacy.  
Most research on the illusion of control has followed Langer’s (1975) lead in 
seeking to identify situational factors that give rise to what is assumed to be a 
unidimensional effect: an over-estimation of personal skill.  We argue that the effect is 
likely to be more complex than this. For example, Wohl and Enzle (2002) found that, 
prior to a lottery drawing, participants who were allowed to choose a lottery ticket 
instead of simply being assigned one by a computer expressed greater confidence of 
winning. Our CFA results suggest that a person allowed to choose her lottery ticket 
might feel more confident of winning because she was able to choose numbers that 
haven’t appeared for some time, or because she was able to choose her ‘lucky’ 
number. More generally, our findings imply that the same situational factor can give 
rise to different kinds of illusory control, depending on what pre-existing beliefs are 
applied in reasoning about the factor. 
In light of the explanation of the illusion of control advanced in this study, we 
propose that greater conceptual clarity might be achieved by exchanging the terms 
‘primary’ and ‘secondary’ for ‘natural’ and ‘supernatural’, respectively. Rothbaum et 
al. (1982) meant for the original terms to indicate that, in instances of perceived 
secondary control, a higher force rather than the individual takes the controlling 
action. In this study, the illusion of control is defined as a theory-driven belief in an 
effective personal action, be it a strategy or ritual. In the case of a ritual, the theory 
(belief structure) driving the action concerns supernatural agents and their powers. In 
the case of a strategy, the underlying theory pertains to natural phenomena. It, 
therefore, seems more appropriate to distinguish between variants of the illusion of 
control based on the belief structures that potentially inform them. 
Future surveys of erroneous gambling-related beliefs 
From a psychometric perspective, our findings are generally consistent with the broad 




































































Drake Beliefs About Chance Inventory. One of the observed factors expresses beliefs 
that winning odds can be improved through supernatural means (illusory secondary 
control), whereas the other expresses beliefs that winning odds can be improved 
through natural means, including strategies based on the gambler’s fallacy (illusory 
primary control). Other similar distinctions are observed in the Gambler’s Beliefs 
Questionnaire (Steenbergh et al., 2002) that captures a distinction between the same 
illusion of primary control factor and a ‘Luck/Perseverance’ factor. In combining 
statements about the value of persistence with statements about luck, the latter factor 
captures the ‘cyclical luck’ component of the illusion of secondary control – the belief 
that one should persevere in waiting for a period of good luck. On the other hand, 
there are items in the often cited Gambling Related Cognitions Scale (Raylu & Oei, 
2004) that appear ambiguous in that it is unclear how the beliefs they express might 
have emerged from the gambler’s fallacy or supernatural beliefs: “Relating my losses 
to bad luck and bad circumstances makes me continue gambling”, “Relating my losses 
to probability makes me continue gambling”, and “Remembering how much money I 
won last time makes me continue gambling”.  
The conducted EFA is useful mechanism for identifying weak items for 
potential exclusion in future surveys of erroneous gambling-related beliefs. Candidates 
for exclusion are items with weak factor loadings (e.g., item 22) and items with 
similar loadings on both factors (e.g., items 28 and 60-62). 
A side issue for consideration in future survey development is the role of 
objectively correct statements in gambling-beliefs surveys (e.g., “In slot machine 
gambling, there is no place for any kind of special knowledge”). Seventeen such items 
were included in our survey, nine newly-written. Associated reverse-scored responses 
were, however, excluded from analysis due to lack of correlation with responses to 
other items. Numerous authors have observed that people who gamble hold correct 
and incorrect beliefs without noticing a contradiction between the two (King 1990; 
Livingstone, Wooley and Borrell 2006; Walker 1992a). Walker (1992a, p. 251) 
suggested that correct beliefs are expressed to “avoid ridicule”. Livingstone and 
colleagues (2006) attributed the contradictory beliefs to the fact that the belief 
‘gambling games are chance-driven’ is not logically incompatible with beliefs about 




































































suggestions constitute a case for including objectively correct statements in future 
surveys, even if the statements are consistently excluded from psychometric analyses. 
Walker’s suggestion implies that the inclusion of correct statements would make 
respondents feel more comfortable; Livingstone’s suggests that the inclusion of such 
statements would enhance the survey’s face validity. 
Clinical and policy implications 
Many modern treatment programs and community education initiatives for problem 
gambling are aimed at correcting erroneous gambling-related beliefs. Our work can be 
seen as evidence about internal theories of the world (broader belief structures) that 
are a cause of such beliefs. Therapists treating gambling-related problems can use the 
evidence to develop more coherent typologies of beliefs for discussion with clients. At 
the same time, the evidence suggests that explaining why various types of beliefs are 
erroneous is only one component of therapy and education. The other must address the 
internal-theory-based causes of the beliefs: the gambler’s fallacy and beliefs in the 
supernatural.  As general theories of the world which may have an evolutionary 
history, these causes might not be reversible through therapy. Instead, therapists might 
need to explain to patients that humans have two ingrained broader belief structures or 
information processing tendencies that make them prone to developing erroneous 
beliefs in gambling settings, which are to be avoided for this reason
6
. 
As a working example, our findings have implications for an influential belief-
correction procedure developed in the last two decades by Ladouceur and colleagues 
(e.g., Toneatto & Ladouceur, 2003; Ladouceur, Sylvain, Boutin & Doucet, 2002).  A 
clinically trialled version of this procedure (Ladouceur et al., 2001) had four 
objectives, the first two of which are quoted below: 
a) understanding the concept of randomness: the therapist explained the concept of 
randomness, that each “throw of the dice” is independent, that no strategies exist to 
control the outcome, that there is a negative expectation of gain, and that it is 
impossible to control the game; b) understanding the erroneous beliefs held by 
gamblers: this component mainly addressed the difficulty of applying the principle of 
independence of random events: the therapist explained how an illusion of control 
                                                 
6
 Fortune and Goodie (2012) echo this point in observing that gambling environments might be 




































































contributes to the maintenance of gambling habits, and then corrected these erroneous 
beliefs... (pp. 776-7) 
The procedure’s emphasis on explaining the ‘independence’ of random events is 
consistent with our conceptual framework. Many erroneous beliefs stem from the 
gambler’s fallacy, so explanation of the principle of independence should alert the 
patient to the error of many of their beliefs.  
Where Ladouceur’s approach is inconsistent with our results is in its 
presentation of the illusion of control as another underlying cause of erroneous 
beliefs. In our framework, this underlying causal role is played by the gambler’s 
fallacy, while the illusion of control is a descriptive term for expressed erroneous 
beliefs. In other words, our results suggest that a more coherent approach would 
involve explaining that erroneous beliefs are illusions driven by the general gambler’s 
fallacy.  Treatment could, further, involve outlining various explanations for why the 
gambler’s fallacy is so widespread. Tversky and Kahneman’s (1974) notion of a 
representativeness bias is one explanation and it was mentioned earlier in this paper. 
Another explanation, put forward by Estes (1964), describes the gambler’s fallacy as a 
branch of the rational belief that many real-world outcomes follow a law of sampling 
without replacement. Given the way weather systems work, for instance, it is rational 
to assume that a sunny period draws nearer with each day of rain (see Hahn and 
Warren 2009 for a third theory). The next step would be to explain that gambling 
environments are dangerous and need to be avoided because they take advantage of 
the human proneness to the gambler’s fallacy and ensuing erroneous beliefs. 
According to our results, Ladouceur and colleagues’ approach could also 
benefit from greater emphasis on common gambling-related beliefs about luck, rituals 
and other supernatural phenomena. Since, according to Atran and Norenzayan (2004), 
these beliefs share evolutionary and conceptual roots with religious beliefs, explaining 
why they are erroneous could present difficulties. For example, explaining why a 
certain ritual is ineffective could involve challenging the existence of God. Once the 
erroneous nature of some of the patient’s specific supernatural gambling beliefs is 
established, the therapist can explain that these beliefs are the product of a more 
ingrained belief structure that is, like the gambler’s fallacy, likely to be evolved. Atran 




































































about supernatural agents, their power and their responsiveness to rituals came to be 
related. 
In sum, our findings help distinguish between gambling-related beliefs and 
their causes, and between two causes. This should allow therapists to work from a 
more coherent typology of beliefs and should encourage them to warn patients about 
the potential immutability of the causes – an immutability that makes gambling 
environments highly dangerous. 
Limitations 
A clear limitation of the study is that our main hypotheses regarding the structure of 
gambling-related beliefs could feasibly only be tested through CFA, which is 
customarily performed on scale scores. Therefore, our model accounted for variance 
in averaged rather than raw agreement scores. In addition, the averaged scores 
(expressing the six belief sub-categories) were calculated based on purely theoretical 
grounds rather than exploratory statistical ones. However, with a cross-loading 
‘cyclical nature of luck’ sub-category, the belief sub-categories were not detectable 
through exploratory factor analysis. Moreover, the theory-driven parceling of items 
into scales is recommended in CFA (Floyd & Widaman, 1995). 
Conclusion 
We attempted to reconcile three frequently cited concepts in factor-analytic research 
on erroneous gambling-related beliefs. These are the illusion of control, the distinction 
between illusions of primary and secondary control, and the gambler’s fallacy. 
Groupings for gambling-beliefs survey statements were suggested based on the 
proposal that the illusion of control, a set of beliefs about effective gambling action 
patterns, is caused by general belief structures such as the gambler’s fallacy, in 
interaction with situational factors. The gambler’s fallacy gives rise to the illusion of 
primary (natural) control while a general set of beliefs about supernatural agents gives 
rise to the illusion of secondary (supernatural) control. Seventy survey statements 
were then categorised in line with the suggested groupings, and CFA was used to 
demonstrate that category intercorrelations expressed higher-order natural and 
supernatural illusion-of-control constructs. The findings have implications for research 




































































in treatment settings. More broadly, the findings provide preliminary evidence for a 
perspective that gambling-related beliefs are, at least in part, a function of broader 






































































Atran, S., & Norenzayan, A. (2004). Religion’s evolutionary landscape: 
Counterintuition, commitment, compassion, communion. Behavioral and Brain 
Sciences, doi: 10.1017/S0140525X04000172  
Ayton, P., & Fisher, I. (2004). The hot hand fallacy and the gambler’s fallacy: Two 
faces of subjective randomness? Memory & Cognition, doi: 
10.3758/BF03206327 
Cummins, R. A., & Nistico, H. (2002). Maintaining life satisfaction: The role of 
positive cognitive bias. Journal of Happiness Studies, doi: 
10.1023/A:1015678915305 
Curran, P. J., West, S. G., & Finich, J. F. (1996). The robustness of test statistics to 
nonnormality and specification error in confirmatory factor analysis. 
Psychological Methods, doi: 10.1037/1082-989X.1.1.16  
DiStefano, C., Zhu, M., & Mîndrilă, D. (2009). Understanding and using factor scores: 
Considerations for the applied researcher. Practical Assessment, Research & 
Evaluation, 14, Available online: http://pareonline.net/getvn.asp?v=14&n=20 
(Last accessed: 20 November 2012) 
Duong, T., & Ohtsuka, K. (2000). Vietnamese Australian gamblers’ views on luck and 
winning: A preliminary report. In J. MacMillen & L. Laker (Eds.), Developing 
strategic alliances: Proceedings of the 9th National Association for Gambling 
Studies Conference, Gold Coast, Queensland 1999 (pp. 151 – 160). Kew, 
Australia: The National Association for Gambling Studies. 
Ejova, A., Delfabbro, P., & Navarro, D. (2010). The illusion of control: Structure, 
measurement and dependence on reinforcement frequency in the context of a 
laboratory gambling task. In W. Christensen, E. Schier, & J. Sutton (Eds.), 
ASCS09: Proceedings of the 9th conference of the Australasian society for 
cognitive science (pp. 84–92). Sydney: Macquarie Centre for Cognitive 




































































Estes,W. K. (1964). Probability learning. In A.W. Melton (Ed.), Categories of human 
learning (pp. 88–128). New York: Academic Press. 
Ferris J., & Wynne, H. (2001) The Canadian Problem Gambling Index: Final report. 
Ottawa (ON): Canadian Centre on Substance Abuse. 
Fortune, E. F., & Goodie, A. S. (2012). Cognitive distortions as a component and 
treatment focus of pathological gambling: A review. Psychology of Addictive 
Behaviors, doi: 10.1037/a0026422 
Fox, J., Nie, Z., & Byrnes, J. (2012). sem: Structural Equation Models. R package 
version 3.0-0. http://CRAN.R-project.org/package=sem 
Goodie, A. S., & Fortune, E. F. (2013). Measuring cognitive distortions in 
pathological gambling: Review and meta-analyses. Psychology of Addictive 
Behaviors, doi: 10.1037/a0031892 
Griffiths, M. D. (1994). The role of cognitive bias and skill in fruit machine gambling. 
British Journal of Psychology, doi: 10.1111/j.2044-8295.1994.tb02529.x 
Hahn, U., & Warren, P. A. (2009). Perceptions of randomness: Why three heads are 
better than four. Psychological Review, doi: 10.1037/a0015241 
Henslin, J. M. (1967). Craps and magic. American Journal of Sociology, Available 
online: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2776031 (Last accessed 20 November 
2012)  
Hooper, D., Coughlan, J., & Mullen, M.R. (2008). Structural equation modelling: 
Guidelines for determining model fit. Electronic Journal of Business Research 
Methods, 6(1), 53-60. 
Jahoda, G. (1969). The psychology of superstition. London: Allen Lane, Penguin 
Press. 
Jefferson, S., & Nicki, R. (2003). A new instrument to measure cognitive distortions in 
video lottery terminal users: The Informational Biases Scale (IBS). Journal of 




































































Kahneman, D. & Tversky, A. (1972). Subjective probability: a judgment of 
representativeness. Cognitive Psychology, doi: 10.1016/0010-0285(72)90016-3 
Keren, G. & Wagenaar, W. A. (1985). On the psychology of playing blackjack: 
Normative and descriptive considerations with implications for decision 
theory. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, doi: 10.1037/0096-
3445.114.2.133 
King, J.M. (1990). Neutralizing marginally deviant behaviour: Bingo players and 
superstition. Journal of Gambling Studies, doi: 10.1007/BF01015748  
Kline, R. B. (2010). Principles and Practice of Structural Equation Modeling (3rd 
edition). The Guilford Press. 
Ladouceur, R., Sylvain, C., Boutin, C., & Doucet, C. (2002). Understanding and 
treating the pathological gambler. London: Wiley. 
Ladouceur, R., Sylvain, C., Boutin, C., Lachance, S., Doucet, C., Leblond, J., & 
Jacques, C. (2001). Cognitive treatment of pathological gambling. Journal of 
Nervous and Mental Disease, doi: 0022-3018/01/18911–774. 
Langer, E. J. (1975). The illusion of control. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.32.2.311 
Livingstone, C., Wooley, R. & Borrell, J. (2006). The Changing Electronic Gambling 
Machine (EGM) Industry and Technology. Melbourne, Australia: Australian 
Institute of Primary Care. 
www.austgamingcouncil.org.au/images/pdf/eLibrary/2680.pdf (Last accessed 
20 November 2012) 
MacCallum, R. C., Widaman, K. F., Zhang, S. & Hong, S. (1999). Sample size in 
factor analysis. Psychological Methods, doi: 10.1037/1082-989X.4.1.84  
Mardia. K. V. (1970) : Measures of multivariate skewness and kurtosis with 
applications. Biometrika, doi: 10.1093/biomet/57.3.519 
Murphy, G. L., & Medin, D. L. (1985). The role of theories in conceptual coherence. 




































































Nickerson, R. S. (2002). The production and perception of randomness, Psychological 
Review, doi: 10.1037//0033-295X.109.2.330 
Oskarsson, A. T., Van Boven, L., McClelland, G. H., & Hastie, R. (2009). What’s 
next? Judging sequences of binary events. Psychological Bulletin, doi: 
10.1037/a0014821 
Raylu N., & Oei T. P. (2004). The Gambling Related Cognitions Scale (GRCS): 
development, confirmatory factor validation and psychometric properties. 
Addiction, doi: 10.1111/j.1360-0443.2004.00753.x 
Revelle, W. (2012). psych: Procedures for Personality and Psychological Research. 
Northwestern University, Evanston, http://personality-
project.org/r/psych.manual.pdf, 1.2.8 
Rothbaum, F., Weisz, J. R., & Snyder, S. S. (1982). Changing the world and changing 
the self: A two-process model of perceived control. Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology, doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.42.1.5  
Skinner, B. F. (1948). ‘Superstition’ in the pigeon. Journal of Experimental 
Psychology, doi: 10.1037/h0055873 
Steenbergh, T. A., Meyers, A. W., May, R. K., & Whelan, J. P. (2002). Development 
and validation of the Gamblers’ Beliefs Questionnaire. Journal of Addictive 
Behaviours, doi: 10.1037//0893-164X.16.2.143 
Toneatto, T., Blitz-Miller, T., Calderwood, K., Dragonetti, R. & Tsanos, A. (1997) 
Cognitive distortions in heavy gambling. Journal of Gambling Studies, doi: 
10.1023/A:1024983300428 
Toneatto, T. (1999). Cognitive psychopathology of problem gambling. Substance Use 
& Misuse, doi: 10.3109/10826089909039417 
Toneatto, T., & Ladouceur, R. (2003). Treatment of pathological gambling: A critical 





































































Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1973). Availability: A heuristic for judging frequency 
and probability. Cognitive Psychology, doi: 10.1016/0010-0285(73)90033-9 
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1974). Judgement under uncertainty: Heuristics and 
biases. Science, doi: 10.1126/science.185.4157.1124 
Ullman, J. B. (2006). Structural equation modelling: Reviewing the basics and moving 
forward. Journal of Personality Assessment, doi: 
10.1207/s15327752jpa8701_03 
Wagenaar, W. A. (1988). Paradoxes of Gambling Behavior. Hove: Erlbaum. 
Wagenaar, W. A., & Keren, G. (1988). Chance and luck are not the same. Journal of 
Behavioral Decision Making, doi: 10.1002/bdm.3960010202 
Walker, M. B. (1992a). Irrational thinking among slot machine players. Journal of 
Gambling Studies, doi: 10.1007/BF01014652 
Walker, M. (1992b). The Psychology of Gambling. London: Pergamon Press. 
Wellman, H. M., & Gelman, S. A. (1992). Cognitive development: foundational 
theories of core domains. Annual Review of Psychology, doi: 
10.1146/annurev.ps.43.020192.002005 
Wohl, M. J. A., & Enzle, M. E. (2002). The deployment of personal luck: Sympathetic 
magic and illusory control in games of pure chance.  Personality and Social 
Psychology Bulletin, doi: 10.1177/014616702236870 
Wohl, M. J. A., & Enzle, M. E. (2009). Illusion of control by proxy: Placing one’s fate 
in the hands of another. British Journal of Social Psychology, doi: 
10.1348/014466607X258696 
Wood, W. S., & Clapham, M. M. (2005). Development of the Drake Beliefs about 





































































Figures and tables 
Fig 1. A proposed basis for distinguishing between the illusions of primary and 
secondary control: the general belief structures that give rise to them. Notably, in a 
gambling context, where luck is a particularly relevant supernatural agent, the 
gambler’s fallacy contributes to shaping the belief that luck is cyclical. 
Situational factors in 
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about natural 
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Fig 2. The CFA model of erroneous gambling-related beliefs, based on the proposed 
definition of primary and secondary illusory control. The six belief sub-categories are 
indicator variables, while the two forms of the illusion of control are higher-order 
latent variables. 
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Table 1. Examples of survey statements reflecting sub-categories of the illusions of 
primary and secondary control 
Illusion of primary control 
Beliefs in ‘negative recency’ strategies 
 If I’m experiencing a losing streak, the thought that a win has to be coming 
soon keeps me gambling.
1
 




 Sometimes I feel that I can keep winning because I have learned to predict the 
next random, new thing the machine is going to do.
3
 
Beliefs in ‘systems of play’ (i.e., strategies generally) 
 Show me a gambler with a well-planned system and I’ll show you a winner.4 
 I know I can win if I follow my strategies.5 
Beliefs in a ‘persistence’ strategy 
 If I continue to gamble, it will eventually pay off and I will make money.2 
 Those who don’t gamble much don’t understand that gambling success 




Illusion of secondary control 
Beliefs in the ‘power and omniscience’ of supernatural agents 
 I believe that fate is against me when I lose.4 
 Some gamblers are just born lucky.4 
Beliefs in ‘ritual’ appeals to supernatural agents 
 There are certain things I do when I am betting (for example, tapping a certain 
number of times, holding a lucky coin in my hand, crossing my fingers, etc.) 
which increase the chances that I will win.
2
 
 I can improve my chances of winning by performing special rituals.4 
Belief that ‘luck is cyclical’ 
 There are times that I feel lucky and thus gamble those times only.1 
 It is good advice to stay with the same pair of dice on a winning streak.4 
 
1
 The Informational Biases Scale (Jefferson & Nicki, 2003) 
2
 Gamblers’ Beliefs Questionnaire (Steenbergh et al., 2002) 
3
 Newly-written for this study 
4
 Drake Beliefs About Chance Inventory (Wood & Clapham, 2005) 
5





































































Table 2. Belief sub-categories: constituent items, descriptive statistics, distributional 
















11-41 -1.1 (1.01) 0 -.86 .95 -3.0 – 
1.4 
Persistence 42-46 -1.6 (1.09) .53 -.52 .77 -3.0 – 
1.4 
Cyclical 
nature of luck 




55-62 -1.3 (1.13) .13 -1.03 .83 -3.0 – 
1.3 




Table 3. Pearson correlations between belief sub-category scores 
 Neg. rec. Systems  Persist. Cyclical luck Omnisc. 
Systems of 
play 
.87     
Persistence .72 .77    
Cyclical nature 
of luck 
.84 .86 .71   
Omniscience 
and power 
.82 .84 .72 .84  
Rituals .72 .74 .63 .75 .83 
 




































































Table 4. Standardised and unstandardised coefficients for the fitted CFA model  
 β B SE 
Illusion of primary control  Negative recency .92 1.00  
Illusion of primary control  Systems of play .95 .94 .03 
Illusion of primary control  Persistence .80 .86 .04 
Illusion of primary control  Cyclical luck .66 .71 .09 
Illusion of secondary control  Cyclical luck .26 .26 .09 
Illusion of secondary control  Omnisc. and power .97 1.07 .04 
Illusion of secondary control  Rituals .85 1.00  
e1  Negative recency .16 .20 .02 
e2  Systems of play .10 .11 .01 
e3  Persistence .35 .43 .04 
e4  Cyclical luck .17 .20 .02 
e5  Omnisc. and power .06 .08 .02 
e6  Rituals .27 .39 .04 




 for indicators: Negative recency: .84, Systems of play: .90, Persistence: .64, 




































































Appendix A: Survey 
Participant instructions 
Below are 100 statements about gambling. Read each statement carefully and indicate 
the degree to which you agree or disagree with it. Unless a statement explicitly refers 
to a particular type of gambling (e.g., dice, lotteries) consider it a statement about 
poker machine gambling. Don't spend too long thinking about any particular 
statement. Just go with your initial reaction. Spend approximately 20 seconds on each 
statement. 
Scale 
Strongly disagree (-3), Disagree (-2), Moderately disagree (-1), Neither agree nor 
disagree (0), Moderately agree (1), Agree (2), Strongly agree (3) 
Sources 
 Drake Beliefs About Chance Inventory (DBC; Wood & Clapham, 2005) 
 Gamblers’ Beliefs Questionnaire (GBQ; Steenbergh, Meyers, May & Whelan, 
2002) 
 The Predictive Control Scale of the Gambling Related Cognitions Scale 
(GRCS; Raylu & Oei, 2004) 
 The Informational Biases Scale (IBS; Jefferson & Nicki, 2003) 
 Thoughts and Beliefs About Gambling questionnaire devised by (TBAG; 
Joukhador, Maccallum & Blaszczynski, 2003) 
 Questionnaire developed by Moore and Ohtsuka (1998) 
 Weinstein Event Characteristics (W; included in Moore and Ohtsuka, 1999) 
 Primary and Secondary Control Beliefs Scale (PSCB; Williams, 2007, 
unpublished Honours thesis) 





































































In South Australia, where the survey was administered, slot machines are typically 
referred to as “poker” machines. 
Items 
1. The longer I’ve been losing, the more likely I am to win. (DBC) 
2. I should keep the same bet even when it hasn’t come up lately because it is bound 
to win. (GBQ) 
3. If I am gambling and losing, I should continue because I don’t want to miss a win. 
(GBQ) 
4. Even though I may be losing with my gambling strategy or plan, I must maintain 
that strategy or plan because I know it will eventually come through for me. 
(GBQ) 
5. I have some control over predicting my gambling wins. (GRCS) 
6. If I keep changing my responses, I have less chances of winning than if I keep the 
same response every time. (GRCS) 
7. Losses when gambling are bound to be followed by a series of wins. (GRCS) 
8. If I’m experiencing a losing streak the thought that a win has to be coming soon 
keeps me gambling. (IBS) 
9. Sometimes I feel that I can keep winning because I have learned to predict the 
next random, new thing the machine is going to do. (Newly-written, Ayton and 
Fischer 2004)  
10. Winning in poker machine gambling is a matter of knowing how random patterns 
work. Each time, the machine is bound to do something different to what it did in 
the previous round. (Newly-written, Ayton and Fischer 2004)  
11. I will be more successful if I have a system for playing poker machines. (DBC) 
12. A good poker machine, roulette or dice gambler is like a sportsperson who knows 
winning plays and when to use them. (DBC) 
13. There are secrets to successful poker machine, roulette and dice gambling that can 
be learned. (DBC) 
14. Show me a [poker machine] gambler with a well-planned system and I’ll show 
you a winner. (DBC) 
15. The more familiar I am with poker machine gambling, the more likely I am to win. 
(DBC) 




































































17. A game of chance is a contest of wills between the game and the player. (DBC) 
18. Playing poker machines is a form of competition between the player and the 
machine. (DBC) 
19. My choices or actions affect the game on which I am betting. (GBQ) 
20. My gambling wins are evidence that I have skill and knowledge related to 
gambling. (GBQ) 
21. My knowledge and skill in gambling contribute to the likelihood that I will make 
money. (GBQ) 
22. I have more skills and knowledge related to gambling than most people who 
gamble. (GBQ) 
23. I am pretty accurate at predicting when a win will occur. (GBQ) 
24. I should keep track of previous winning bets so that I can figure out how I should 
bet in the future. (GBQ) 
25. When I am gambling, “near misses” or times when I almost win remind me that if 
I keep playing I will win. (GBQ) 
26. I think of poker machine gambling as a challenge. (GBQ) 
27. When I have a win once, I will definitely win again. (GRCS) 
28. A series of losses will provide me with a learning experience that will help me win 
later. (GRCS) 
29. I believe I can beat the system. (TBAG) 
30. If I lose it’s because something unforseen has happened. (TBAG) 
31. I know I can win if I follow my strategies. (TBAG) 
32. Identifying a pattern helps me predict a winner. (TBAG) 
33. The chances of winning improve after a near win. (TBAG) 
34. When I've lost it's because I've made a hasty decision or didn't concentrate. 
(TBAG) 
35. The way in which I press the buttons on the poker machine can influence the 
outcome. (PSCB) 
36. Winning on poker machines is all about knowing the right time to get on the 
machine. (PSCB) 
37. There is a definite type of person who has big wins at gambling. (W) 
38. To be successful in poker machine gambling it is important to know how to 
maintain a winning streak when one comes around. (Newly-written based on 




































































39. To be successful in poker machine gambling it is important to know how to 
change the flow of the game when facing a losing streak. (Newly-written based on 
Ocean and Smith, 1993) 
40. The machines pay out more at different times of day. (Newly-written based on 
Livingstone, Wooley and Borrell, 2006) 
41. You can win more money overall if you know how to make good use of free spins. 
(Newly-written Livingstone, Wooley and Borrell, 2006) 
42. Where I get money to gamble doesn’t matter because I will win and pay it back. 
(GBQ) 
43. In the long run, I will win more money than I will lose gambling. (GBQ) 
44. If I continue to gamble, it will eventually pay off and I will make money (GBQ) 
45. If I lose money gambling, I should try to win it back. (GBQ) 
46. Those who don’t gamble much don’t understand that gambling success requires 
dedication and a willingness to invest some money. (GBQ) 
47. Wins are more likely to occur on a hot machine (i.e. a machine that has just paid 
out). (DBC) 
48. It is good advice to stay with the same pair of dice on a winning streak. (DBC) 
49. There are times that I feel lucky and thus gamble those times only. (GRCS) 
50. Luck works in cycles and is, therefore, predictable to some extent. (Newly-written 
based on Keren and Wagenaar, 1985) 
51. A series of losses is a sign that good luck is about to set in. (Newly-written based 
on Duong and Ohtsuka, 2000) 
52. You should make at least one bet every day. Otherwise, you might be walking 
around lucky and not even know. (Newly-written based on Aasved, 2002) 
53. It is important to bet big when you feel that you’ve come across a lucky way of 
playing the machine. (Newly-written based on King, 1990) 
54. Luck sometimes hides all the wins behind a certain response pattern, so it’s always 
worth sticking with a response pattern that has just produced a win to check 
whether you’ve stumbled upon a lucky way of playing. (Newly-written based on 
King, 1990) 
55. I believe that fate is against me when I lose. (DBC) 
56. There is useful information in my daily horoscope. (DBC) 
57. Some gamblers are just born lucky. (DBC) 




































































59. I have the psychic ability to predict a winner [in poker machine gambling]. 
(TBAG) 
60. Bad vibes from people around me cause me to lose. (TBAG) 
61. I make the right choice because I'm generally lucky. (TBAG) 
62. It's possible for the good or bad luck of other players at the gambling venue to rub 
off on me. (Newly-written based on Duong and Ohtsuka, 2000) 
63. There may be magic in certain numbers [or actions]. (DBC)  
64. When I need a little luck I wear lucky clothes or jewellery. (DBC) 
65. I can improve my chances of winning by performing special rituals. (DBC) 
66. I like to carry a lucky coin, charm or token when I’m doing something important. 
(DBC) 
67. I have a “lucky” technique that I use when I gamble. (GBQ) 
68. There are certain things I do when I am betting (for example, tapping a certain. 
number of times, holding a lucky coin in my hand, crossing my fingers, etc.) 
which increase the chances that I will win. (GBQ) 
69. Sometimes I think I might have the power to ‘will’ my desired outcomes to come 
up [during poker machine play]. (Moore & Ohtsuka, 1998) 
70. You never know what might happen if you don't perform certain rituals while 
gambling. (Newly-written based on Rudski and Edwards, 2007) 
 
--- Removed prior to model fitting:  
71. I do not consider myself to be a superstitious person. (DBC) 
72. Winning in poker machine gambling is based entirely on chance. (TBAG) 
73. The outcome of one poker machine event has no effect on the outcome of the next. 
(TBAG) 
74. It's a mistake to base any decisions on how lucky you feel. (BIGL) 
75. Luck is nothing more than random chance. (BIGL)  
76. The likelihood of winning a large amount of money in poker machine gambling is 
so small, it’s not worth bothering. (Moore & Ohtsuka, 1998) 
77. I do not expect to win at gambling. (Moore & Ohtsuka, 1998) 





































































79. There is nothing the player can do to influence the outcome of poker machine 
gambling. (Newly-written) 
80. In poker machine gambling there is no place for any kind of special knowledge. 
(Newly-written) 
81. No matter what system of play you adopt in poker machine gambling, your 
chances of winning are no different to anyone else’s. (Newly-written) 
82. Near-misses in poker machine gambling are not a sign that a win is close by. 
(Newly-written) 
83. It is true that any run of losses eventually comes to an end, but this does not mean 
that I can predict when to raise my bet amounts ahead of a win. (Newly-written 
based on Delfabbro, 2004) 
84. Luck does not follow a pattern. (Newly-written) 
85. A gambler can’t be lucky or unlucky by nature. (Newly-written) 
86. Lucky items or charms can’t help a person when playing poker machines. (Newly-
written) 
87. Once you have lost money on poker machine gambling, there is no point playing 
on to win it back. (Newly-written) 
88. I have a special system for picking lottery numbers. (DBC) 
89. If a coin is tossed and comes up heads ten times in a row, the next toss is more 
likely to be tails. (DBC) 
90. When I take a test (or took them in the past) I use a lucky pen or pencil. (DBC) 
91. Gambling is more than just luck. (GBQ) 
92. If I win on a certain machine, I am more likely to use that machine again at a later 
date. (IBS) 
93. After a long string of wins on a machine, the chances of losing become greater. 
(IBS) 
94. A run of losses must come to an end sooner rather than later. (TBAG) 
95. There is a definite type of person who has big losses at gambling. (W) 
96. A person's chances of winning are better if they gamble on a machine that has not 
paid out in a long time. (PSCB) 
97. I try to bet on the maximum number of lines because I don’t want to miss out on a 
big win on a line I didn't gamble. (Newly-written based on Livingstone, Wooley 




































































98. Since poker machines are a game of chance and chance distributes wins evenly 
across different possible responses, the only way to win is to keep ‘changing up’ 
your play pattern. (Newly-written based on Keren and Wagenaar, 1985) 
99. Luck works in a different way to chance. (Newly-written based on Wagenaar and 
Keren, 1988) 
100. It can't hurt to perform little rituals during gambling – just in case. (Newly-




































































Appendix B: Exploratory factor analysis (EFA) 
As a first step, it was ascertained that the 62 survey items of interest (all but the eight 
items in the ‘cyclical luck’ sub-category) satisfied the assumptions of EFA (KMO = 
.96; Bartlett’s test: χ2(1891) = 10966, p < .001; all initial communalities > .4). When 
the items were subjected to Principal Axis Factoring, visual inspection of the scree 
plot suggested a two-factor solution. Table B.1 shows the items that came to define 
each factor after a direct oblimin rotation. 
Table B.1. Factor loadings produced by a PAF analysis with oblimin rotation for the 














1.  The longer I’ve been losing, the 





2.  I should keep the same bet... 
because it is bound to win. 
.62  
3.  ...I don’t want to miss a win.   .44  
4.  ...I must maintain that strategy or 
plan because I know it will 
eventually come through for me. 
 .70  
5.  I have some control over 
predicting my gambling wins.  
 .34  
6.  If I keep changing my responses, I 
have less chances of winning...  
 .70  
7.  Losses... are bound to be followed 
by a series of wins.  
 .44  
8.  The thought that a win has to be 
coming soon keeps me gambling... 
 .73  
9.  Sometimes I feel that I can keep 
winning because I have learned to 
predict the next random thing the 
machine is going to do.  
  -.47 
10.  Winning in poker machine 
gambling is a matter of knowing 
how random patterns work. 
 .55  
11.  I will be more successful if I have 






12.  A good poker machine, roulette or 
dice gambler is like a sportsperson 
who knows winning plays and 
when to use them. 

















































































13.  There are secrets to successful 





14.  Show me a gambler with a well-
planned system and I’ll show you 
a winner. 
 .34  
15.  The more familiar I am with poker 
machine gambling, the more likely 
I am to win. 
 .69  
16.  One should pay attention to lottery 
numbers that often win. 
 .49  
17.  A game of chance is a contest of 
wills between the game and the 
player. 
 .59  
18.  Playing poker machines is a form 
of competition between the player 
and the machine. 
 .46  
19.  My choices or actions affect the 
game... 
 .47  
20.  ... gambling wins are evidence that 
I have skill and knowledge... 
.56  
21.  My knowledge and skill in 
gambling contribute to the 
likelihood that I will make money. 
 .46  
22.  I have more skills and 
knowledge... than most people 
who gamble. 
 .26 -.22 
23.  I am pretty accurate at predicting 
when a win will occur. 
  -.50 
24.  I should keep track of previous 
winning bets... 
 .52  
25.  ...  “near misses” or times when I 
almost win remind me that if I 
keep playing I will win.  
 .67  
26.  I think of poker machine gambling 
as a challenge. 
 .55  
27.  When I have a win once, I will 
definitely win again. 
 .53  
28.  A series of losses will provide me 
with a learning experience... 
 .40 -.32 
29.  ... I can beat the system.  .36  
30.  If I lose it’s because something 
unforseen has happened. 
  -.49 
31.  ... I can win if I follow my 
strategies. 
 .53  
32.  Identifying a pattern helps...  .57  
33.  The chances of winning improve 
after a near win... 

















































































34.  When I've lost it's because I've 






35.  The way in which I press the 
buttons... can influence the 
outcome. 
  -.36 
36.  Winning... is all about knowing 
the right time to get on the 
machine.  
 .67  
37.  There is a definite type of person 
who has big wins at gambling. 
 .58  
38.  ... it is important to know how to 
maintain a winning streak when 
one comes around.  
 .73  
39.  ... it is important to know how to 
change the flow of the game when 
facing a losing streak. 
 .52  
40.  The machines pay out more at 
different times of day.  
 .44  
41.  You can win more... if you know 
how to make good use of free 
spins.  
 .74  
42.  Where I get money to gamble 
doesn’t matter because I will win 




43.  In the long run, I will win more 
money than I will lose gambling. 
  -.41 
44.  If I continue to gamble, it will 
eventually pay off and I will make 
money 
 .50  
45.  If I lose money gambling, I 
should try to win it back. 
 .50  
46.  ... gambling success requires 
dedication and a willingness to 
invest some money.  
 .40  




48. 56. There is useful information in my 
horoscope. 
  -.47 
49. 57. Some gamblers are just born 
lucky. 
 .57  
50. 58. Following lucky signs can help 
me win. 
  -.58 
51. 59. I have the psychic ability to 
predict a winner. 
  -.64 
52. 60. Bad vibes from people around me 
cause me to lose. 



















































































54. 61. I make the right choice because 






55. 62. ... the good or bad luck of other 
players could rub off on me. 
 .40 -.35 





57. 64. ... I wear lucky clothes or 
jewellery. 
  -.63 
65. I can improve my chances of 
winning by performing special 
rituals. 
  -.75 
58. 66. I like to carry a lucky coin, charm 
or token... 
  -.73 
59. 67. I have a “lucky” technique that I 
use... 
 .31 -.43 
60. 68. There are certain things I do when 
I am betting; for example, tapping 
a certain. number of times, 
holding a lucky coin in my hand... 
  -.64 
61. 69. ... I have the power to ‘will’ my 
desired outcomes to come up.  
  -.40 
62. 70. You never know what might 
happen if you don't perform 
certain rituals... 
  -.57 
63. Variance explained after rotation 21% 18% 
64. Correlation between factors -.73 
65.  
66. Note: Factor loadings of magnitude <.3 are suppressed (except for item 22) 
67. * For exact item wording, see Appendix A. 
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